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Abstract
We study a model in which a CEO can entrench himself by hiding information from the
board that would allow the board to conclude that he should be replaced. Assuming that
even diligent monitoring by the board cannot fully overcome the information asymmetry vis-
à-vis the CEO, we ask if there is a role for CEO compensation to mitigate the ineﬃciency.
Our analysis points to a novel argument for high-powered, non-linear CEO compensation
such as bonus pay or stock options. By shifting the CEO’s compensation into states where
the firm’s value is highest, a high-powered compensation scheme makes it as unattractive as
possible for the CEO to entrench himself when he expects that the firm’s future value under
his management and strategy is low. This, in turn, minimizes the severance pay needed to
induce the CEO not to entrench himself, thereby minimizing the CEO’s informational rents.
Amongst other things, our model suggests how deregulation and technological changes in
the 1980s and 1990s might have contributed to the rise in CEO pay and turnover over the
same period.
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[M]any CEOs still take the "mushroom" approach to their boards: Keep them in the dark and
cover them with manure.
James E. Orlikoﬀ
1 Introduction
The decision to replace the CEO is arguably one of the most important decisions made by the
board of directors. Yet, to make this decision the board needs information–information that is
often controlled by the very CEO it is supposed to judge. The CEO’s control over information in
the boardroom thus puts a natural limit on the board’s ability to eﬀectively monitor him: “[T]he
CEO most always determines the agenda and the information given to the board. This limitation
severely hinders the ability of even highly talented board members to contribute eﬀectively to
the monitoring of the CEO and the company’s strategy” (Jensen (1993)).1
Most eﬀorts to improve boards’ monitoring eﬀectiveness have focused on the board itself, e.g.,
by increasing the number of outsiders on boards or by including board members with financial
expertise. As empirical studies show, however, the eﬀects of these changes on performance are
modest.2 Indeed, if it is true that even “highly talented board members” cannot fully overcome
the information asymmetry vis-à-vis the CEO, then this may not surprise. After all, there may
be a natural limit as to what can be accomplished through monitoring.
On a priori grounds, there is no reason why eﬀorts to improve boards should be limited to
the board in a narrow sense. In the end, any institution or governance instrument that can
help mitigate the information asymmetry vis-à-vis the CEO will also make the board a better
monitor. Starting from this premise, we focus on a governance instrument that, like the board
of directors, has received much attention recently: executive compensation. To study the role
of executive compensation in mitigating the information disparity between the board and the
CEO, we assume the board cannot actively reduce this disparity any further through additional
monitoring. Hence, when the board makes a decision it must rely on information that is provided
1Similarly, Coﬀee (2003) argues that “one must look beyond the board, in particular to those who provide or
control its informational inputs”.
2See Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) for a survey of the empirical literature. The trend towards board members
with greater expertise has recently manifested itself in Section 101 of the Sarbanes-Oxley (2002) Act, which
stipulates that “[t]he board will have five financially-literate members.”
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by the CEO. What this means, of course, is that the CEO can eﬀectively control the board’s
decision through his strategic choice of what information to provide.
To fix ideas, we consider a model in which the board must decide whether to replace the
incumbent CEO. We model the information asymmetry between the board and the CEO by
assuming that prior to the board meeting the CEO privately observes the “state of nature”,
which is a noisy signal of the firm’s future value under his strategy and management. The
term “state of nature” is suﬃciently general to admit alternative interpretations. Perhaps the
most natural interpretation is that it constitutes a signal of the CEO’s ability to create value
at this particular job in this particular firm. In that sense, the state of nature is a proxy for
the match quality between the firm and the CEO, like in Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and
Hermalin (2004).3 Another interpretation is that the CEO is hired to implement a particular
business strategy (e.g., he is hired because of his reputation as a cost-cutter), and he privately
observes an early signal indicating the likely success of this strategy. If the CEO’s tenure is
closely linked to this particular strategy then he has an incentive to hide information suggesting
that the strategy should be changed.4
Our assumption that the board must rely on the CEO’s information to make its replacement
decision suggests that the CEO can easily entrench himself by hiding negative information that
would allow the board to conclude that he should be replaced. Indeed, absent any countervailing
incentives, this is precisely what the CEO would do, for he is biased in favor of staying in power–
a bias that arises endogenously in our model. It is therefore immediate that any optimal CEO
compensation package must include some form of severance pay or a golden parachute; otherwise
the CEO would always entrench himself.5
3 In both models the board can acquire a noisy signal about the CEO’s match-specific quality while the
CEO cannot directly influence the board’s information. In contrast, in our model the board cannot improve its
information set any further but must instead rely on information provided by the CEO.
4The management literature provides ample evidence that strategy changes are often accomplished by hiring
a new CEO (e.g., Hambrick, Geletkanycz, and Fredrickson (1993), Barker and Duhaime (1997), Gordon et al.
(2000)). Relatedly, Rotemberg and Saloner (2000) argue that hiring a CEO with a particular vision and style is
a credible signal to the firm’s employees that the firm will pursue a particular strategy.
5The use of golden parachutes or severance pay to induce CEOs to give up their power has been previously
examined in, e.g., Lambert and Larcker (1985), Harris (1990), and Almazan and Suarez (2003). What both
Almazan and Suarez (2003) and our paper show is that severance pay and on-the-job compensation may be
related in equilibrium.
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Oﬀering the CEO severance pay is only one side of the coin, however. When considering
whether or not to entrench himself, the CEO compares the value of his severance package with
the expected value of his on-the-job compensation that he receives if he remains in power. This
suggests that the CEO’s on-the-job compensation scheme should force him to “put his money
where his mouth is”: if he contends that the firm’s future value under his management and
strategy is high, then he should be rewarded generously if this turns out to be true but punished
(subject to limited liability) if it does not. By this reasoning, the CEO’s optimal compensation
scheme should shift as much as possible of his on-the-job compensation into states where the
firm’s future value is highest. In our base model, where we impose only little structure on the
optimal compensation scheme, this implies that the CEO’s optimal on-the-job compensation
scheme is a high-powered, discontinuous bonus scheme. If we impose more structure, the precise
functional form of the CEO’s optimal on-the-job compensation scheme may change, but not the
basic principle that as much as possible of the CEO’s compensation should be shifted into states
where the firm’s value is highest. To obtain more structure, we consider a simple problem in
which the CEO can manipulate the firm’s future share value. In this case, his optimal on-the-
job compensation scheme becomes a stock option. The economic principle underlying the result
remains the same, however.
In summary, a high-powered, non-linear on-the job compensation scheme is optimal in our
model as it minimizes the CEO’s expected on-the-job compensation in states of nature where
the firm’s expected future value under his strategy and management is low. Consequently, less
severance pay is needed to induce the CEO to give up power in such states. In our model,
severance pay constitutes a measure of the CEO’s informational rents. Hence, a high-powered,
non-linear compensation scheme minimizes the CEO’s informational rents. Incidentally, while
we focus on information-based entrenchment where the CEO can assure his retention by hiding
negative information, it is not critical for our results that the CEO has better information at the
board meeting. As we will show, our model is isomorphic to one in which both the CEO and the
board know the true state of nature at the board meeting but the CEO learns it before the board
does. Instead of hiding negative information–which is now no longer possible by assumption–
the CEO can, after observing a low state of nature, make an irreversible “protective” investment
that makes it suboptimal for the board to subsequently replace him, as in Shleifer and Vishny
(1989) or Scharfstein and Stein (2000). All our results continue to hold under this alternative
4
notion of entrenchment.
While our analysis suggests that it is optimal to combine severance pay with high-powered,
non-linear on-the-job compensation, it also suggests that there is a delicate balance between these
two instruments. If one or the other is set too high, the CEO will either always prefer to entrench
himself or he will shirk and ineﬃciently focus on his exit options. Moreover, our analysis implies
that the CEO’s on-the-job compensation and severance pay must move in the same direction.6
Finally, while a combination of severance pay and high-powered on-the-job compensation is the
least-cost way of mitigating the CEO’s entrenchment in our model, it remains costly. For this
reason, it is only optimal to mitigate, but not fully eliminate, the CEO’s entrenchment.
Our result that a combination of severance pay and high-powered on-the-job compensation
minimizes information-based entrenchment is novel and, we believe, intuitive. It is arguably
diﬀerent from existing arguments for high-powered CEO compensation based on moral hazard
(Innes (1990)) or risk-taking (Lambert (1986)). Our analysis also cautions that observing gener-
ous high-powered compensation packages in firms where boards are weak does not automatically
imply that executives divert wealth from shareholders (cf., Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). On the
contrary, such packages may well be part of an optimal arrangement that is in place precisely
because monitoring by the board is ineﬀective.7
As we stated above, our model admits alternative interpretations. One such alternative
interpretation concerns the firm’s shutdown decision. Suppose instead of deciding whether to
replace the CEO the board must decide whether to shut the firm down, in which case the CEO
6In a comprehensive legal study of CEO employment contracts in the U.S., Schwab and Thomas (2004) find
that more than 93 percent of such contracts formally stipulate severance pay. In virtually all these cases, the size of
the CEO’s severance pay is linked to his on-the-job pay. The most common contractual award is two years’ salary.
The authors also dispense with the myth that CEOs in the U.S. are employed at will. The overwhelming majority
of CEOs either have a formal employment contract or some other formal contractual arrangement governing issues
that are otherwise found in employment contracts, such as severance pay. Relatedly, Lefanowicz, Robinson, and
Smith (2000) find that managers whose employment contracts stipulate generous golden parachutes tend to be
more highly compensated on their jobs. While Yermack (2004) also finds that severance pay is positively related to
the CEO’s on-the-job pay, his data includes–besides contractual severance pay–additional “golden handshakes”
that are paid upon the CEO’s departure.
7We have hitherto only argued with respect to the optimal form of executive compensation, not with respect
to its magnitude. In Section 5 we show than in an environment where implementing change is important it may
be optimal to grant CEOs potentially very generous compensation packages.
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naturally loses his job. The CEO again observes the state of nature, which is now a signal of the
firm’s future value if it is continued. For fear of losing his job, the CEO might then propose that
the firm should be continued even if shutting down is eﬃcient. This is precisely what Jensen
(1993) views as a main obstacle to what he refers as “Modern Industrial Revolution”: managers
are reluctant to shut down their firms, thus impeding the eﬃcient transfer of assets from old,
declining industries to new, thriving industries.8 Given this alternative interpretation, our model
implies that a combination of severance pay and high-powered on-the-job compensation is the
least-cost way to get managers to accept the necessary shutdown of their firms. This is consistent
with the observation by Mehran, Norgler, and Schwartz (1997) that option grants seem to have
a positive eﬀect on the likelihood of voluntary liquidation. It is also consistent with Dial and
Murphy’s (1995) clinical study of General Dynamic’s partial liquidation, where stock option
programs helped to overcome managers’ resistance against liquidating plants and selling oﬀ
assets, even if this meant that they had to sacrifice their own jobs.
In the final part of this paper we derive additional testable implications. For instance, we
find that when the ex-ante likelihood that a strategy change becomes optimal increases–like
in the 1980s and 1990s when massive technological changes and deregulations fundamentally
changed the industrial landscape in the U.S.–then both the level of CEO compensation and
CEO turnover should increase correspondingly. This is consistent with the widely documented
surge in executive compensation, especially incentive pay, during the 1980s and 1990s (Hall
and Liebman (1998), Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005)) as well as Huson, Parrino, and Starks’
(2001) finding that CEO turnover has increased over the past decades. Another implication
of our model is that CEOs of larger firms should receive both higher on-the-job compensation
and higher severance pay, while at the same time CEO turnover should also be higher. Yet
another implication is that in firms with weak corporate governance–defined as firms where it
is relatively easier for CEOs to shirk or appropriate private benefits–we should see both higher
severance pay and higher CEO on-the-job compensation, but also more entrenchment.
Several recent papers examine issues that are related to our paper. We will review these
papers in the next section as well as in Section 5 when we discuss additional implications of our
model. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the model. Section
8“Even when managers do acknowledge the requirement for exit, it is often diﬃcult for them to accept and
initiate the shutdown decision” (Jensen (1993)).
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4 contains our main analysis. Section 5 derives additional testable implications. Section 6
concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Related Literature
To put our paper into perspective, it is helpful to recall its main features. First, the ineﬃciency
we are concerned with is that low-quality CEOs may not get replaced. (Or, alternatively, that
unsuccessful firm strategies may not get changed). Second, the reason for this ineﬃcieny is that
the CEO has private information vis-à-vis the board. Third, assuming that monitoring by the
board cannot fully resolve this ineﬃency, we ask if there is a role for other corporate governance
instruments. Specifically, our focus here is on executive compensation.
While the papers discussed below are all related to ours, only two papers share our focus
on optimal executive compensation design: Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Dow and Raposo
(2005). In both papers, the CEO’s optimal on-the-job compensation scheme is a bonus scheme,
like here. The rationale is diﬀerent, however. In these papers a bonus scheme is optimal because
the CEO must be motivated to exert eﬀort or make an unobservable investment.9 By contrast,
in our model a bonus scheme is optimal because it minimizes the CEO’s (informational) rents
if he is privately informed about the firm’s future value under his management.
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and Hermalin (2004) consider the same ineﬃciency as this
paper: CEOs that are a poor match for the firm may not get replaced. Unlike this paper,
however, it is not the CEO but the board who obtains a private signal about the CEO’s match-
specific quality. The focus is consequently on the board’s endogenous monitoring decision, not
on the CEO’s decision to hide information from the board.
In Almazan and Suarez (2003), like here, the CEO can eﬀectively veto his replacement
(“weak board”). What is diﬀerent is the underlying ineﬃciency, and hence the role of CEO
compensation. There is no asymmetric information between the CEO and the board. As a con-
sequence, the board’s replacement decision is first-best eﬃcient, regardless of the CEO’s initial
compensation contract. Rather than examining the (in)eﬃciency of the board’s replacement
decision, the authors focus on the impact that this decision has on the CEO’s ex-ante incentives
to create value. This leads to a novel argument for severance pay: severance pay creates a direct
9While our model also has a simple moral hazard problem, this problem has no direct implications for the
CEO’s optimal on-the-job compensation scheme (see Section 4.1).
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link between the CEO’s payoﬀ from renegotiations with the board and his ex-ante investment,
which makes it a more eﬀective, and hence cheaper, instrument to motivate the CEO than costly
on-the-job incentive pay.
As we noted in the Introduction, we can alternatively interpret our model as one in which
the CEO privately observes whether it is optimal to change the firm’s strategy. In this regard,
our paper is related to recent work by Dow and Raposo (2005) and Eisfeldt and Rampini (2004).
In Dow and Raposo’s model the CEO has private information with respect to available strategy
choices, while the shareholders’ problem is to get him to implement the strategy that is best for
the firm given that they do not know what is available. While none of the available strategy
choices involves the CEO’s replacement, the CEO naturally chooses the strategy that yields him
the highest rents, like in our model. In Eisfeldt and Rampini’s model a manager has private
information about the productivity of the assets under his control. To induce a low-productivity
manager to relinquish control of his assets (in the extreme case: shut down the firm)–so that
they can be used more productively elsewhere–shareholders must pay him a bonus, which is
similar to the use of severance pay in our model.
Finally, in Adams and Ferreira (2003) the CEO must also decide whether to reveal informa-
tion to the board. The information is about the firm itself, however, not about the CEO’s ability,
which is unknown to both the CEO and the board. The benefit of revealing information is that
the board can give the CEO better advice; the cost is that it can monitor him with greater
precision. Song and Thakor (2004) also consider the CEO’s decision to reveal information to
the board. The focus of their paper is on the board’s advisory role, however, not its role as
an institution deciding on the CEO’s replacement. Assuming that neither side knows the other
side’s ability, the authors show how career concerns aﬀect both the CEO’s decision to pass on
information to the board and the board’s decision to approve ideas proposed by the CEO.
3 The Model
The model has three dates: t = 0, 1, and 2. In t = 0 a firm hires a CEO. In t = 1 the firm’s
board decides whether to retain or replace the CEO. Which of the two is optimal depends on
the state of nature θ ∈ Θ := [θ, θ], which is privately observed by the CEO prior to the board
meeting. The state of nature is a noisy signal of the firm’s future value in t = 2 under the
CEO’s management, which is denoted by s ∈ S := [s, s]. We assume θ and s are related via
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the conditional distribution function Gθ(s). The density function gθ(s) is continuous in both θ
and s, where gθ0(s)/gθ(s) is strictly increasing in s for all θ0 > θ in Θ. Accordingly, high states
of nature are good news for the firm’s future value under the CEO’s management in that they
put more probability mass on high values of s in the sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio
Property (MLRP).10
The fact that the CEO privately observes the state of nature is meant to capture the fact
that he has an informational advantage vis-à-vis the board with respect to information that is
relevant for the replacement decision.11 For concreteness, let us assume θ is a noisy signal of the
quality of the match between the CEO and the firm. If θ is high, the CEO is a good match and
likely to generate a high future firm value, and vice versa. Initially, i.e., in t = 0, everybody has
common expectations about this match quality, which are expressed by the distribution function
F (θ) with positive density f(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ.12 All distribution functions in our model are
atomless.
Instead of assuming that θ is a signal of the match quality between the CEO and the firm,
we could alternatively assume that it is a signal indicating how successful the firm’s current
strategy is. Accordingly, if θ is high, the firm’s future value under the current strategy is likely
to be high, and vice versa. If we additionally assume that the hiring of the CEO is directly
linked to the firm’s strategy (see Introduction), then a low value of θ implies that the CEO
should optimally be replaced, just like above.
Realistically, whether the firm’s future value under the CEO’s management is high or low
will not only depend on the CEO’s match-specific quality, but also on whether the CEO is
suﬃciently dedicated to his job. For simplicity, we assume if the CEO shirks the state of nature
is θ = θ. As will become clear shortly, this assumption is stronger than what we need–all
10MLRP is satisfied by many probability distributions (see Milgrom (1981)).
11We will show in Section 4.6 that our model can be alternatively interpreted as one in which both the board
and the CEO know θ in t = 1 but the CEO observes it before the board and can take appropriate actions to
entrench himself. Although presumably realistic, it is thus not crucial that the CEO has better information in
t = 1–it suﬃces if he learns the state of nature before the board does.
12Our assumption that the replacement decision depends on the match quality between the CEO and the
firm and that everybody has initially common expectations about this match quality is similar to Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998) and Hermalin (2004). While there is evidence consistent with the notion that CEOs vary
according to their skills (Daines, Nair, and Kornhauser (2005)), our notion of match-specific quality alludes to
the interaction between CEO skill and firm type, not CEO skill as such.
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we need is that if the CEO shirks the state of nature is suﬃciently low so that replacing the
CEO becomes optimal. If the CEO works hard to implement the firm’s strategy we assume θ is
generated by the distribution function F (θ) described above. We assume it is optimal to induce
the CEO to work hard.13 This is costly, however: it means the CEO must forgo private benefits
B > 0. Whether or not the CEO works hard is unobservable.
Denote by V > 0 the expected future firm value if the CEO is replaced. Realistically, this
value will depend on the expected match quality between the firm and a potential replacement
CEO. There is no need to make distributional assumptions about V . This is because the
expected match quality between the firm and a potential replacement CEO is not informative
(in a statistical sense) about the match quality between the firm and its current CEO.
We argued above that the term “state of nature” admits alternative interpretations. For
instance, θ might be a noisy signal of how successful the firm’s current strategy is. In this case,
V represents the firm’s expected future value under the next best strategy alternative.14 Under
a related but somewhat narrower interpretation, θ might be a noisy signal indicating whether it
is optimal for the firm to continue or shut down, in which case the CEO naturally loses his job.
In this case, V represents the firm’s liquidation value.
As a reference point, let us briefly consider the (first-best) optimal replacement decision if
the state of nature was commonly observable and hence contractible. The optimal decision rule
in this case is to retain the CEO if E[s | θ] := RS gθ(s)ds ≥ V and to replace him if E[s | θ] < V.
Ruling out trivial cases where the CEO is either retained or replaced in all states of nature, this
implies there exists a unique interior cutoﬀ state θFB ∈ (θ, θ) such that the CEO is retained if
13 In other words, the distribution function F (θ) holds along the equilibrium path where the CEO works hard.
While admittedly simplistic, this eﬀort problem is a parsimonious–perhaps the most parsimonious–way of creat-
ing a wedge between the CEO’s severance pay and his expected on-the-job pay without having direct implications
for the shape of his optimal on-the-job compensation scheme (see Section 4.1).
14While there is no reason why the CEO should have private information about the match quality between the
firm and a potential replacement CEO, he might have private information about the firm’s expected future value
under the next best strategy alternative. In this case, it can be shown that the CEO should receive severance pay
that is contingent on the firm’s future value under this alternative strategy. Such payoﬀ-contingent severance pay
is, to the best of our knowledge, not observed in practice, however. Unless the CEO remains aﬃliated with the
firm, e.g., as a member of the board, accelerating vesting provisions typically allow him to recoup the value from
previously awarded stock or option grants, while other material rights are generally forfeited.
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and only if θ ≥ θFB.15
The crux with implementing the first best is that to make its decision the board must rely on
information provided by the CEO. The focus of our analysis is on how the CEO’s incentives to
provide the board with information depend on his compensation structure. Denote the CEO’s
on-the-job compensation by w(s) ≤ s, which implies it is a function of the firm’s realized value
in t = 2. In contrast, if the CEO is replaced in t = 1 he receives severance pay W . As we
will show in Section 4.5, assuming that the CEO’s compensation package takes the simple form
assumed here–where w(s) depends only on s and where W is a fixed payment–is without loss
of generality. In fact, it is strictly optimal.16 To make the board’s problem nontrivial, we assume
it is optimal to replace the CEO in some but not all states of nature.17 If it was optimal to
either replace or retain the CEO in all states of nature, the board would have no interest in
eliciting the CEO’s private information.
Finally, to keep the derivation of our main results as simple as possible, we assume that w(s)
is nondecreasing in s. This assumption is only for expositional convenience. As will become clear
shortly, it will never be optimal to make w(s) a decreasing function of s, i.e., the postulated
constraint that w(s) be nondecreasing does not bind at the optimal solution.
4 Analysis
4.1 The Board’s Problem
Notice first that the board cannot pay the CEO a fixed wage w(s) = w for all s ∈ S. If it did,
the CEO would either always (i.e., for all θ ∈ Θ) or never want to stay in power depending on
whether w is greater or smaller than W. Arguably, if w(s) = w =W the CEO is just indiﬀerent.
But if his on-the-job compensation is exactly equal to his severance pay, he has no incentives to
work hard.
15As Gθ(s) satisfies MLRP, it satisfies First-Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD), which implies E[s | θ] is
strictly increasing in θ. In conjunction with continuity of gθ(s) in θ, this implies there exists a unique interior
cutoﬀ θFB given by E[s | θFB] = V .
16Precisely, we show in Section 4.5 that although the CEO has private information in t = 1 it is not optimal to
oﬀer him a more complex menu of compensation schemes in which either w(s) or W depend nontrivially on θ.
17This is optimal, for instance, if i) E[s | θ] is suﬃciently greater than V for high and suﬃciently smaller than
V for low values of θ, and if ii) F (θ) puts suﬃcient probability mass on both high and low values of θ.
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Given that w(s) is nondecreasing, ruling out w(s) = w implies that the CEO’s on-the-job
compensation must be strictly increasing in s for some s ∈ S on a set of positive measure. In
conjunction with the fact that Gθ(s) satisfies MLRP, this implies that his expected on-the-job
compensation E[w(s) | θ] must be strictly increasing in θ for all θ ∈ Θ. We thus have the
intuitive result that under any feasible compensation scheme the CEO’s expected on-the-job
compensation will be higher if the match quality between him and the firm is good.
In t = 1 the CEO must decide what information to pass on to the board. Realistically, the
CEO will provide the board with various pieces of information, some of which will be positive
while others will be more negative. If the board makes its decision based on its beliefs about
the CEO’s match quality, then this implies that the CEO can move the board’s decision in
one direction or another by strategically holding back some of the more positive or negative
information, respectively.
When deciding what information to reveal, the CEO compares his expected on-the-job com-
pensation E[w(s) | θ] with his severance pay W. Since E[w(s) | θ] is strictly increasing and
continuous in θ, this implies there exists a unique interior cutoﬀ value θ∗ = θ∗(w,W ) ∈ (θ, θ)
given by
E[w(s) | θ∗] =W (1)
such that E[w(s) | θ] ≥W if and only if θ ≥ θ∗. Note that while θ is a continuous variable, the
CEO may provide the board only with coarse information. This is because the board’s decision
is a binary decision, implying that we can conveniently categorize any information provided by
the CEO as either “positive” information resulting in his retention or “negative” information
resulting in his replacement. We will come back to this issue in Section 4.5 when we consider
general menus of the form {w(s, θ),W (θ)}.
Given that E[w(s) | θ] ≥ W if and only if θ ≥ θ∗, the CEO’s optimal choice of information
provision is as follows. If θ ≥ θ∗ he provides the board with “positive” information resulting in his
retention. As we discussed above, this means the CEO will strategically hold back information
that could potentially trigger his replacement. On the other hand, if θ < θ∗ the CEO’s severance
pay is so high (or equivalently: the match quality is so poor) that he has no incentives to hide
information. Hence, the board will (correctly) infer from the provided information that the state
of nature is low and replace the CEO.18
18Technical note: in standard mechanism-design parlor, the categorization into “positive” and “negative” infor-
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We will show later that at the optimal solution it holds that θ∗ < θFB. Accordingly, there
exists a positive interval [θ∗, θFB) where the CEO entrenches himself by hiding negative infor-
mation even though (first-best) eﬃciency dictates that he should be replaced. We shall refer to
[θ∗, θFB) as the CEO’s “entrenchment region”.
We can now set up the board’s maximization program to determine the CEO’s optimal
compensation package. The board chooses the CEO’s on-the-job compensation w(s) and his
severance pay W to maximize shareholders’ expected payoﬀ
F (θ∗)(V −W ) +
Z θ
θ∗
E[s− w(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ, (2)
where θ∗ depends on w(s) and W as described in (1). When designing the CEO’s compensation
package, the board must ensure that the CEO is suﬃciently dedicated to his job. The CEO’s
expected payoﬀ if he works hard isZ θ
θ∗
E[w(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ + F (θ∗)W. (3)
On the other side, the CEO’s payoﬀ if he shirks is B +W. While shirking allows the CEO to
consume his private benefits, it results in a low state of nature in which–given his optimal
information strategy–he will be replaced.
Accordingly, the CEO works hard if and only if the term in (3) equals or exceeds B +W.
Rearranging this inequality, we have that the CEO works hard if and only ifZ θ
θ∗
E[w(s)−W | θ]f(θ)dθ ≥ B, (4)
which implies there must be a suﬃciently large wedge between the CEO’s expected on-the-job
compensation and his severance pay. While this wedge follows naturally from the fact that the
CEO must be motivated to work hard, it has an important implication: it endogenously biases
the CEO to remain in power. This bias to remain in power is what causes the CEO to entrench
himself in situations when replacing him is eﬃcient, which is the fundamental ineﬃciency we
are concerned with in this paper.
mation employed here refers to an indirect mechanism. In the corresponding direct mechanism that we analyze
the CEO truthfully announces θ. What the above paragraph then says is that under any feasible direct mechanism
it must hold that for all θ ≥ θ∗ the CEO is retained and receives w(s) while for all θ < θ∗ he is replaced and
receives W. This follows immediately from the relevant truthtelling constraints in conjunction with the fact that
w(s) = w is not feasible.
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On the other side, the wedge implied by (4) has no immediate consequences for the shape of
the CEO’s optimal on-the-job compensation scheme w(s). It merely requires that on average–
i.e., across all “retention states” θ ≥ θ∗–the CEO’s expected on-the-job compensation be
suﬃciently greater than his severance pay. But it says nothing about how precisely w(s) should
vary with s. This is important, for it implies that our results regarding the optimal shape of w(s)
are exclusively driven by concerns of how to reduce the CEO’s entrenchment, not by concerns
of how to get him to work hard.19
4.2 The Optimal CEO Compensation Scheme
The following observation follows from standard arguments.
Lemma 1. The incentive constraint (4) ensuring that the CEO works hard to implement the
firm’s strategy must hold with equality.
Rearranging (4) (with equality) shows that the CEO’s expected compensation net of being
compensated for his forgone private benefits B equalsZ θ
θ∗
E[w(s) | θ]f(θ)dθ + F (θ∗)W −B =W. (5)
Consequently, the CEO extracts a rent equal to W on top of being compensated for his forgone
private benefits.
Proposition 1. The CEO earns a rent equal to the size of his severance pay.
To see what causes the board to leave the CEO a rent, recall that there must be a posi-
tive wedge between the CEO’s expected on-the-job compensation and his severance pay. When
oﬀering the CEO severance pay, the board must consequently also increase his on-the-job com-
pensation. Rearranging (4) yieldsZ θ
θ∗
E[w(s) | θ] f(θ)
1− F (θ∗)dθ =W +
B
1− F (θ∗) . (6)
19Another way of seeing this is as follows. One can easily show that if θ is observable and contractible–in
which case there is no entrenchment problem–there exist mechanisms satisfying (4) that implement the first best,
including some where w(s) takes the form of a fixed wage. An example is the mechanism whereby the CEO is
retained if and only if θ ≥ θFB, in which case his on-the-job compensation is w = B/[1− F (θFB)]. (The CEO’s
severance pay is zero in this case.)
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Hence, if the board wants to raise the CEO’s severance pay by, say, $1 million it must raise his
expected on-the-job compensation by the same amount.20 Regardless of whether the CEO is
eventually replaced or not, he is thus better oﬀ by $1 million.
The fact that severance pay constitutes a measure of the CEO’s rents strikes us as a realistic
implication of our model. It derives from the fact that the board cannot directly penalize the
CEO for shirking because it cannot disentangle the diﬀerent possible causes of a low state of
nature. All it can do is replace the CEO. On the one side, the state of nature may be low
because–despite working hard–the CEO is a poor match for the firm. On the other side,
the state of nature may be low because the CEO has shirked. In the first case, severance pay
constitutes a reward for the CEO not to entrench himself. In the second case, severance pay
constitutes a “reward” for the CEO’s shirking.
Also plausible, we believe, is the implication that an increase in the CEO’s severance pay
must be matched by a simultaneous increase in his on-the-job compensation. If the CEO’s on-
the-job compensation does not increase along with his severance pay, he will focus too much on
his exit options, implying he will lack incentives to work hard to implement the firm’s strategy.
In summary, granting the CEO severance pay is costly as it leaves him rents. However,
without severance pay the CEO would always entrench himself because his expected on-the-
job compensation is positive–even if W = 0–as he must be compensated for forgoing private
benefits. (This can be seen by setting W = 0 in (6).) Hence, without severance pay we would
have θ∗ = θ.
Inserting (4) (with equality) into (2), the board’s objective function becomesZ θ
θ∗
E[s | θ]f(θ)dθ + F (θ∗)V −B −W. (7)
Writing the board’s objective function this way illustrates that the board has two (conflicting)
objectives. The first three terms in (7) represent the total surplus created, implying the board
will try to maximize eﬃciency. Specifically, since E[s | θ] − V is negative and decreasing in
θ if θ < θFB and positive if θ > θFB, the board will try to push θ∗ up as close as possible
towards θFB, thus minimizing the CEO’s entrenchment region [θ∗, θFB). On the other hand,
the final term in (7) implies that the board will seek to minimize the CEO’s severance pay W
and therefore his rents.
20Precisely, the left-hand side in (6) denotes the CEO’s expected on-the-job compensation conditional on staying
on the job.
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Given the board’s objective function, we can now formally derive the CEO’s optimal com-
pensation package. Note first that any optimal compensation package must include severance
pay. If W were equal to zero the CEO would never be replaced. As for the CEO’s optimal
on-the-job compensation scheme w(s), we can state the board’s problem in two equivalent ways.
Holding the CEO’s severance pay W fixed, the optimal on-the-job compensation scheme must
maximize the cutoﬀ value θ∗. Conversely, holding the cutoﬀ value θ∗ fixed, the optimal on-the-
job compensation scheme must minimize the CEO’s severance pay W. One problem is the dual
of the other. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. The uniquely optimal CEO compensation package consists of severance pay and
a bonus scheme that pays w(s) = 0 if s < sˆ and w(s) = s if s ≥ sˆ for some sˆ ∈ (s, s).
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 shows that the CEO’s optimal on-the-job compensation scheme is a high-
powered, non-linear bonus scheme that shifts all of his on-the-job compensation into states
where the firm’s value s is highest. In turn, the CEO receives nothing when s is low. The
intuition is straightforward. As low firm values are relatively more likely after a low state of
nature (due to the fact that Gθ(s) satisfies MLRP), the bonus scheme described in Proposition
2 minimizes the CEO’s expected on-the-job compensation in low states of nature. This makes it
as unattractive as possible for the CEO to continue in these states, which implies less severance
pay will be needed to induce him not to entrench himself. Formally, the bonus scheme described
in Proposition 2 minimizes E[w(s) | θ] at low values of θ, thus implementing a given cutoﬀ θ∗
with the minimum possible amount of severance pay.
Given that the CEO earns a rent (in dollar terms) equal to W, and given that the interval
[θ∗, θFB) represents the CEO’s entrenchment region, we can state Proposition 2 alternatively as
follows: A high-powered bonus scheme minimizes the CEO’s rents while allowing a given level of
entrenchment, or equivalently, it minimizes the CEO’s entrenchment while leaving him a given
amount of rents.
The flip side of shifting all of the CEO’s compensation into states where the firm’s value is
highest is that the bonus scheme described in Proposition 2 provides the CEO with a relatively
high expected compensation in high states of nature. This is inconsequential, however, as in
high states of nature it is indeed optimal to retain the CEO.
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4.3 Discussion and Further Analysis
To the best of our knowledge, our argument that shifting the CEO’s entire compensation into
states where the firm’s value is highest makes the board’s replacement decision more eﬃcient is
novel. However, we are not the first model in which it is optimal to shift an agent’s entire payoﬀ
into extreme states of nature. In Innes’ (1990) moral hazard model, for instance, it is optimal
to shift the entrepreneur’s entire payoﬀ into high cash-flow states as these are most informative
about his eﬀort. In both our model and Innes’ model–like in other related models where it
is optimal to shift an agent’s entire payoﬀ into extreme states of nature (e.g., Nachman and
Noe (1994))–the result hinges on an assumption that the underlying probability distribution
satisfies a particular monotonic ordering.21
Absent any further constraints, the fact that the CEO’s entire compensation should be shifted
into states where the firm’s value is highest implies that his optimal compensation scheme will
take an extreme form: it makes the CEO the full claimant to the firm’s value above a certain
threshold (denoted by sˆ in Proposition 2).22 Such a discontinuous compensation scheme may
entail problems of its own, however. For instance, if the firm’s value in t = 2 increases only
slightly from sˆ−ε to sˆ, the CEO’s compensation jumps from zero to w(s) = sˆ, which in turn may
tempt the CEO to manipulate the firm’s value upwards. To examine the implications of this
problem for the optimal compensation scheme, suppose the CEO retires in t = 2 while the firm
is long-lived. We shall now depart from our previous setup and assume the CEO can manipulate
the firm’s value in t = 2. Manipulation comes at a private cost h(∆), where ∆ = |s0 − s| and
where s0 denotes the manipulated firm value and s denotes the true value. The cost function
h(∆) is nondecreasing and convex with h(0) = 0 and h0(0) = γ, where γ is positive but small.23
21Both Innes (1990) and this paper assume that the probability distribution satisfies MLRP. Other monotonic
orderings sometimes used in the literature are conditional stochastic dominance (e.g., Nachman and Noe (1994))
or, closely related, the monotone hazard rate property.
22The only binding constraint we have hitherto imposed on the CEO’s on-the-job compensation scheme is
w(s) ≤ s. As noted previously, the constraint that w(s) be nondecreasing was only introduced to simplify the
analysis. Given that the optimal solution requires to shift as much as possible of the CEO’s compensation into
states where s is highest, it is easy to see that this constraint does not bind at the optimum.
23The CEO’s private cost of manipulating the firm’s value by ∆ might realistically be less than ∆–at least for
small ∆–implying that γ ≤ 1. The special case where γ = 1 coincides with an assumption frequently made in
the financial contracting literature that s−w(s) be nondecreasing (e.g., Innes (1990), Nachman and Noe (1994),
DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999)). The argument commonly used to justify this assumption is that otherwise the firm’s
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Manipulation may be costly for the CEO either because it requires additional eﬀort or because
the CEO faces negative consequences if the manipulation is detected.
We restrict consideration to optimal on-the-job compensation schemes ensuring that no ma-
nipulation takes place in equilibrium. Since h(∆) is nondecreasing and convex, any compensation
scheme ruling out “small” manipulations around ∆ = 0 automatically also rules out “large” ma-
nipulations ∆ > 0, which implies the binding constraint on the CEO’s optimal compensation
scheme derives from the derivative of h(∆) at ∆ = 0.24
The fact that the CEO can manipulate the firm’s value in t = 2 introduces an additional
constraint on his optimal on-the-job compensation scheme, namely, that the CEO’s marginal
manipulation cost at ∆ = 0 must equal or exceed his marginal benefit from manipulating for
all s ∈ S. Since the CEO’s optimal on-the-job compensation scheme requires to shift as much
as possible of his compensation into states where the firm’s value is highest, this additional
constraint is binding. We then have the following result.
Proposition 3. Suppose the CEO can manipulate the firm’s value in t = 2 at marginal cost
greater than or equal to γ > 0. Then the uniquely optimal CEO compensation package consists
of severance pay and some on-the-job compensation scheme paying w(s) = 0 if s < sˆ and
w(s) = γ(s− sˆ) if s ≥ sˆ for some sˆ ∈ (s, s).
Proof. See Appendix.
While it is still true that the CEO’s optimal on-the-job compensation scheme must shift
as much as possible of his compensation into states where the firm’s value is highest, there is
now an additional binding constraint that renders the discontinuous bonus scheme proposed in
Proposition 2 infeasible. Arguably, the compensation scheme proposed in Proposition 3 is less
extreme than that proposed in Proposition 2. Instead of making the CEO the full claimant to
the firm’s value above some threshold, the CEO now only receives a fraction γ of the firm’s
incremental value above some threshold. This compensation scheme can be implemented by
shareholders might have an incentive to destroy firm value.
24 If a “small” manipulation from s to s0 = s+ ε is ruled out, then any “large” manipulation from s00 << s to
s0 is also ruled out as the manipulation cost for the last increment from s to s0 is weakly greater under the large
manipulation due to the fact that h0(∆) is nondecreasing. An analogous argument holds for s0 = s− ε.
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giving the CEO stock options.25 In what follows, we will continue with the optimal compensation
scheme derived in Proposition 3.
Realistically, the CEO’s manipulation technology will depend on the firm’s corporate gov-
ernance, which is endogenous, but also on its legal and regulatory environment. It is therefore
of interest to consider the eﬀect of an exogenous shift in the CEO’s manipulation cost. The
following result is immediate given Proposition 3 and our preceding discussion.
Proposition 4. As the CEO’s marginal manipulation cost γ increases, his optimal on-the-job
compensation scheme becomes “steeper”–i.e., the pay-for-performance sensitivity increases–
and it becomes less costly to reduce the CEO’s entrenchment.
Proof. See Appendix.
The robust insight from our analysis is that the CEO’s optimal compensation scheme should
shift as much as possible of his compensation into states where the firm’s value is highest. How
much precisely “as much as possible” is will depend on the constraints imposed on the model.
In a relatively unconstrained setting like that in Section 3.2, the optimal compensation scheme
is a high-powered, discontinuous bonus scheme. If we introduce a simple manipulation problem
like in this section, the optimal compensation scheme becomes a stock option. There are many
other possible constraints that one might want to consider, although some are more diﬃcult to
incorporate in our model than others. For instance, to obtain a closed-form solution we must
assume that the CEO is risk neutral. While this assumption is restrictive, it might be less of
a problem for CEOs who are potentially less risk averse than ordinary employees due to their
high wealth. A simple, yet arguably crude way of capturing some basic aspects of risk aversion
would be to introduce a minimum consumption requirement w(s) ≥ C. With this additional
constraint, the optimal compensation scheme in Proposition 3 changes only insofar as the CEO
now receives a base wage equal to C in addition to stock options.
25The option’s “strike price” sˆ is uniquely pinned down by the requirement that (4) binds. For the sake of
brevity, Proposition 3 does not include the case where γ is suﬃciently close to zero so that (4) cannot be satisfied
for any sˆ > s. As γ approaches zero, the option’s “strike price” sˆ goes to s and the CEO’s optimal on-the-job
compensation scheme becomes w(s) = F + γs, which can be implemented by giving the CEO a fixed wage of F
plus stock.
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4.4 Severance Pay and Entrenchment
From Section 4.2 we know that the optimal CEO compensation scheme minimizes his severance
pay (and hence his informational rents) W while holding the cutoﬀ θ∗ fixed, or equivalently, it
maximizes θ∗ while holding W fixed. We shall now explore the implications of a change in W
on θ∗. Intuitively, as W increases it becomes relatively less attractive for the CEO to continue.
At the same time, however, the increase in W must be matched by a simultaneous increase
in the CEO’s expected on-the-job compensation to preserve the wedge required by (4), which
makes it relatively more attractive for the CEO to continue. As we will show, under the optimal
CEO compensation scheme the first eﬀect outweighs the second, implying the overall eﬀect of
an increase in W is that it increases θ∗, thus reducing the CEO’s entrenchment.
Under the optimal compensation scheme derived in Proposition 3 (or Proposition 2 for that
matter), the increase in the CEO’s on-the-job compensation that is necessary to match the
increase in W will occur at relatively high values of s, implying the CEO’s expected on-the-
job compensation E[w(s) | θ] increases primarily in high states of nature. Conversely, in low
states of nature E[w(s) | θ] increases only little. Hence, while on average the CEO’s expected
on-the-job compensation must increase one-for-one with his severance pay (cf., (6)), it increases
by more than W in high and by less than W in low states of nature. Consequently, in low states
of nature the diﬀerence E[w(s) | θ] −W decreases, implying it is possible to push up θ∗ by
increasing W, thus reducing the CEO’s entrenchment (at the cost of leaving him more rents).
Proposition 5. Under the optimal CEO compensation scheme the board can reduce the CEO’s
entrenchment by increasing his severance pay. This is despite the fact that an increase in the
CEO’s severance pay must be matched by a simultaneous increase in his expected on-the-job
compensation to preserve his incentives to work hard. Fully eliminating the CEO’s entrenchment
is too costly, however : at the optimal solution it holds that θ∗ < θFB.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5 illustrates the interplay between the CEO’s on-the-job compensation and his
severance pay. While an increase in either one of these two variables improves the CEO’s
expected payoﬀ, they are not substitutes. Instead, the CEO’s severance pay and his on-the-
job compensation must move in the same direction.26 This has important implications. For
26While the optimal value of W trades oﬀ the benefits of reducing the CEO’s entrenchment against the costs of
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instance, if the board faces pressure to cut the CEO’s severance pay, it cannot compensate him
for the loss by simultaneously raising his on-the-job compensation, and vice versa.27 Tilting
the delicate balance between the CEO’s severance pay and his on-the-job compensation in one
direction or another only creates adverse incentive eﬀects–either for the CEO’s incentives to
work hard or his incentives to entrench himself.
Proposition 5 also shows that it is never optimal to set θ∗ = θFB. Since increasing θ∗ is
costly, it is, of course, also never optimal to set θ∗ > θFB, implying at the optimum it holds that
θ∗ < θFB. The reason is that, by standard arguments, a marginal change in θ∗ at θ∗ = θFB has
a negligible eﬀect on shareholders’ expected payoﬀ. A marginal reduction in the CEO’s rents,
however, constitutes a first-order cost saving for shareholders.
Both academics and shareholder activists have recently put the spotlight on what they
contend are excessive severance packages for top executives. A commonly found argument is
that severance pay constitutes a “reward” for failure, which is not only unnecessary but also
counterproductive as it reduces CEOs’ incentives to work hard.28 Indeed, this is precisely what
would also happen in our model if the CEO’s severance pay were set too high relative to his on-
the-job compensation. However, as granting the CEO severance pay is necessary to induce him
to give up his entrenchment, our analysis cautions that any unduly cut in the CEO’s severance
pay may come at a high cost: while it arguably curtails the CEO’s rents, it weakens his incentives
to give up his entrenchment. The following result is immediate given our previous analysis.
leaving him more rents, the specific solution depends on the distributional assumptions. Once W is pinned down,
however, the remaining choice vvariable sˆ (and therefore also θ∗) is uniquely pinned down by the requirement
that (4) binds.
27This suggests that severance pay is not merely a form of “stealth compensation” (cf., Bebchuk and Fried
(2004)) that can be adjusted to oﬀset cuts in executives’ on-the-job compensation.
28The U.S. has recently witnessed an abundance of such cases. A prominent example is the lawsuit by Walt
Disney shareholders against the company for awarding Michael Ovitz severance pay worth $140 million after
being only 14 months with the firm. But public pressure against severance pay is not limited to the U.S. The
U.K., for instance, recently had a public inquiry about “rewards for failure” (DTI (2003)), and it has witnessed a
substantial amount of shareholder activity against high severance pay. As a result, listing rules were amended in
2002 to require firms to publish their directors’ remuneration reports, which must be approved by shareholders.
While this approval is only advisory, the vote helped shareholder activists to gain publicity in their fight against
high severance packages, for instance in the case of the advertising company WPP, the retailing chain Sainsbury’s,
and perhaps most prominently, in the case of rejecting a £20 million contractually stipulated severance package
for the head of GlaxoSmithKline, Britain’s biggest drug manufacturer.
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Proposition 6. Introducing a binding cap on the CEO’s severance pay is ineﬃcient. While
it reduces the CEO’s rents, it weakens his incentives to give up his entrenchment and reduces
overall shareholder value.
4.5 General Compensation Schemes
Thus far we have assumed that the CEO’s compensation package takes the simple form where
W is a constant and where w(s) depends only on the firm’s value in t = 2. Given that the state
of nature is a continuous variable, one might wonder if the board can possibly do better by tying
the CEO’s compensation even closer to the underlying state of nature. We will now show that
this is not the case.
A more general mechanism would specify that the CEO–after observing the state of nature–
can choose from a prespecified menu of compensation packages. The corresponding direct mech-
anism would specify for every (announced) state of nature θ ∈ Θ i) the board’s action whether
or not to replace the CEO, and ii) severance pay W (θ) if the CEO is replaced and some on-the-
job compensation scheme w(s, θ) if he is retained. Note that both w and W may now depend
nontrivially on θ. Denote the set of states in which the CEO is replaced by Θ− and the set of
states in which he is retained by Θ+ = Θ/Θ−.
It is straightforward to see that it cannot be optimal to have diﬀerent levels of severance
pay in diﬀerent states of nature θ ∈ Θ−. This is because conditional on announcing some
state of nature in the set Θ−, the CEO would always announce the state that yields him the
highest severance pay. That is, he would always announce θ ∈ argmaxθ0∈Θ−W (θ0). The CEO’s
severance pay must consequently be a constant W (θ) =W.
There is a similarly straightforward argument why introducing a menu of on-the-job com-
pensation schemes w(s, θ) is not helpful. Since the board’s decision is binary, all it needs to
know is whether θ is an element of Θ− or Θ+. Neither in the case where the CEO is replaced
nor in the case where he is retained does the board gain anything by having more detailed
information. Hence, there is no obvious reason to let the CEO choose from a menu that reveals
more about the underlying state of nature. In what follows, we will prove an even stronger result
that a menu of on-the-job compensation schemes is strictly suboptimal. The uniquely optimal
solution is thus to oﬀer the CEO the uniquely optimal “single” on-the-job compensation scheme
w(s, θ) = w(s) derived previously.
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The intuition is as follows. The optimal CEO on-the-job compensation scheme derived previ-
ously shifts more of his compensation into states where the firm’s value is highest–thus shifting
more of his expected on-the-job compensation E[w | θ] into high states of nature–than any
other feasible on-the-job compensation scheme. By construction, any richer menu of compensa-
tion schemes w(θ, s)–regardless of whether or not it includes the “single” optimal compensation
scheme–must therefore shift some of the CEO’s expected compensation “back” into low states
of nature.29 That is, a richer menu of compensation schemes does not minimize E[w | θ] when
θ is low. But this property of minimizing the CEO’s expected on-the-job compensation in low
states of nature is precisely what drives optimality in our model, as it allows the board to min-
imize the CEO’s entrenchment at the lowest cost to shareholders. With a richer menu w(θ, s)
the board would thus either have to leave the CEO more informational rents to implement the
same cutoﬀ θ∗, or–if the board wants to hold the CEO’s rents fixed–tolerate a lower cutoﬀ
and hence more CEO entrenchment.
Proposition 7. Even though the CEO has private information with respect to a continuous
variable θ, it is uniquely optimal to oﬀer him a simple compensation package consisting of a
single on-the-job compensation scheme w(s) and a fixed severance payment W .
Proof. See Appendix.
4.6 An Alternative View of Entrenchment
Our base model assumes that the CEO can entrench himself by hiding negative information
that would allow the board to conclude that his match quality is poor. In what follows, we
show that our model is also compatible with a diﬀerent (somewhat more conventional) notion
of entrenchment where the CEO makes an irreversible “protective” investment that makes it
suboptimal for the board to replace him (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Scharfstein and Stein
(2000)). In contrast to our base model, let us now assume that the board can perfectly observe
θ in t = 1. The CEO, however, learns θ before the board does. Moreover, while both the CEO
and the board know θ in t = 1, we assume θ it is nonverifiable. If θ were verifiable, the board
29As this line of reasoning suggests, the argument that a menu of compensation schemes is suboptimal holds
regardless of whether we impose additional constraints on the optimal compensation scheme, as in Proposition 3,
or whether we consider a relatively unconstrained setting like that in Proposition 2.
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could contractually commit to a decision rule based on θ ex ante–even if this rule was ex-post
suboptimal–in which case any protective actions taken by the CEO would be meaningless.
For concreteness, suppose after observing θ the CEO can take a protective action that makes
it harder for a potential successor to take over his job, thus reducing the value of the board’s
option to replace him, which is denoted by V in our model.30 Without loss of generality, we
may assume the CEO can directly control V.31 Denote the CEO’s choice of V by Vˆ . Like in
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000), it is important that the CEO takes
the protective action before meeting with the board. Simply threatening the board to take the
action will not suﬃce: the board would fire the CEO on the spot, thus preventing him from
changing V. Finally, note that the CEO’s action does not aﬀect the firm’s value if he remains in
power; it only aﬀects the value of replacing him.
Given these assumptions, it is easy to see that this model is fully isomorphic to our base
model in which only the CEO knows θ in t = 1. By our previous arguments, the CEO wants to
continue if and only if θ ≥ θ∗, where θ∗ is given by E[w(s) | θ∗] = W . The board, on the other
hand (knowing θ) will retain the CEO in t = 1 if and only if
E[s− w(s) | θ] ≥ Vˆ −W.
Since the left-hand is positive, the CEO can always assure his retention by setting Vˆ suﬃciently
low. Like in our base model, the CEO thus has eﬀective control over the board’s decision. In
consequence, the board’s problem in t = 0 is identical to that in our base model, which implies
our previous results extend qualitatively to this alternative notion of entrenchment.
30Scharfstein and Stein (2000) give the example of a manager who creates an opaque accounting system that
it diﬃcult to understand for a potential successor. Relatedly, the CEO can hide or obscure information that a
successor needs to successfully run the firm. For more examples, see Shleifer and Vishny (1989).
31The model is fully isomorphic to our base model only if the CEO can change V at no cost. While examples
of how the CEO can reduce V are relatively easy to come by, arguing that the CEO can increase V may be more
diﬃcult. In the end, this is not a concern. Assuming that the CEO can freely change V up- or downwards, only
the latter will impose a binding constraint in equilibrium, just like in our base model where the CEO may hide
bad but not good information in equilibrium
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5 Comparative Statics Analysis
5.1 CEO Pay and Business Environment
To induce the CEO to make room for value-increasing changes in the firm’s strategy and manage-
ment, shareholders must leave him valuable rents. Given that reducing the CEO’s entrenchment
is costly, the question is how much entrenchment should the firm’s shareholders optimally toler-
ate? In this section we argue that the answer may depend on the firm’s business environment. In
a stable environment where the ex-ante likelihood that a change in the firm’s strategy and man-
agement becomes optimal in the future is relatively small, the cost of having an entrenched CEO
is also relatively small. Conversely, in a less stable environment where this ex-ante likelihood is
large, the cost of having an entrenched CEO is potentially severe.
In our model, the ex-ante likelihood that a change in the firm’s strategy and management
becomes optimal in the future is F (θFB). As θFB increases, there are more states of nature
in which maintaining the status quo is ineﬃcient. In consequence, the board must raise the
second-best cutoﬀ θ∗ to ensure that the status quo is indeed maintained less often. From our
previous analysis, however, we know that raising θ∗ is costly. It implies the board must increase
both the CEO’s severance pay and–to preserve the wedge required by (4)–also his on-the-job
compensation. Accordingly, we have that CEOs in less stable business environments should
receive both higher severance pay and higher on-the-job compensation. At the same time, the
fact that θ∗ is higher also implies that it becomes more likely that the CEO will be replaced,
i.e., CEO turnover should be higher as well.
In what follows, we assume that the board’s objective function is strictly quasiconcave in
W . This ensures the existence of a uniquely optimal choice of W, and consequently also of θ∗
and w(s). (Once W is pinned down, the remaining choice variables θ∗ and w(s) are uniquely
determined by our model.) We have the following result.
Proposition 8. As the firm’s business environment becomes more unstable–implying it is more
likely that a change in the firm’s strategy and management becomes optimal in the future–
the board increases both the CEO’s severance pay and his on-the-job compensation, while the
likelihood that the CEO is replaced in the future increases correspondingly.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Proposition 8 shows that it can be optimal to pay CEOs potentially generous compensation
packages if the firm’s business environment is relatively unstable.32 This reduces the CEO’s
incentives to entrench himself in precisely those situations where flexibility and the ability to
adapt to changes in the firm’s environment are key.
With the usual degree of caution, we may try to link Proposition 8 to some developments
taking place since the late 1970s. Like Jensen (1993) and many others, Holmström and Kaplan
(2001) have argued that the “pace of economic change has accelerated” since the late 1970s.
Between 1978 and 1996, some of the most important industries in the U.S., including airlines,
broadcasting, entertainment, natural gas, trucking, banks and thrifts, utilities, and telecom-
munications, have experienced massive deregulations (Andrade, Mitchell, and Staﬀord (2001)).
The 1980s and 1990s also witnessed fundamental technological innovations, notably in the in-
formation technology and telecommunications sectors, that have radically altered the industrial
landscape in the U.S. These developments–key forces behind what Jensen (1993) calls “Mod-
ern Industrial Revolution”–have put increasing pressure on U.S. firms to change their business
strategies, industry focus, and managements. The takeover and merger waves of the 1980s and
1990s are frequently viewed as consequences of these developments.
Proposition 8 suggests that the increasing need to remain flexible comes at a potentially high
cost: CEO compensation, both in terms of severance pay and on-the-job compensation, must
increase correspondingly. This is consistent with the surge in CEO stock option grants over the
past decades documented by Hall and Liebman (1998). Accordingly, the mean value of CEO
stock option grants has increased almost sevenfold between 1980 and 1994, from about $155,000
to over $1,210,000. Similarly, Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) show that between 1993 and 2003
the average CEO compensation among S&P 500 firms (measured in 2002 dollars) has increased
almost threefold from $3.7 million to $9.1 million.33 Finally, Huson, Parrino, and Starks (2001)
argue that–concurrent with the rise in CEO compensation–CEO turnover has also increased
over the past decades.
32An increase in uncertainty–e.g., in the form of a mean-preserving spread–does not necessarily imply that it
becomes more likely that a change in the firm’s strategy and management becomes optimal in the future. What
is important is that θFB increases.
33As for severance pay, Walker (2005) argues that there has been a surge in (contractually stipulated) severance
pay, while Lefanowicz, Robinson, and Smith (2000) and Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) find that the use of
golden parachutes has increased substantially in the 1980s and 1990s.
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The recent surge in CEO compensation is also the subject of several related papers. Like this
paper, Dow and Raposo (2005) also link this trend to the fact that firms’ business environments
have become more unstable. In their model, this means CEOs must get higher pay because
the range of possible alternative business strategies–in particular strategies involving radical
changes–has increased, and shareholders must incentivize CEOs not to pursue such radical
strategies.34 Bebchuk and Fried’s (2004) “managerial power perspective” has a substantially
diﬀerent flavor. They argue that the rising stock market of the 1990s gave executives and
boards more latitude to boost executive pay. In their view, boards do not maximize shareholder
value. Murphy and Zábojník (2004), in contrast, argue that the surge in CEO compensation
reflects a fundamental shift in the relative importance of general versus firm-specific human
capital. Beneficiaries are CEOs with above-average general human capital, whose compensation
is being bid up by the market. Finally, both Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Hermalin (2003)
link the rise in CEO compensation to changes in corporate governance. In Almazan and Suarez’
model a shift from weak to strong boards is accompanied by a greater use of incentive pay and
more turnover. Hermalin, on the other hand, argues that the rise in CEO compensation reflects
greater board diligence. To compensate CEOs for the increased likelihood of being fired, their
pay must increase.
Proposition 8 might also lend itself for some cross-sectional implications. Accordingly, indus-
tries witnessing fundamental changes should exhibit higher CEO turnover but also higher CEO
compensation.35 We are not aware of empirical studies analyzing how CEO pay and turnover
depend on industry characteristics.36
Institutional investors in many countries have recently turned against large CEO compen-
sation packages, mainly in response to public pressure. While Proposition 8 implies that high
CEO compensation may be warranted under some circumstances, it does not say that high CEO
34 In some sense, the problem is the opposite of ours where CEOs must be incentivized not to block changes.
35 In fact, one of the implications of our model is that the increase in CEO severance pay and on-the-job
compensationmore than compensates CEOs for an increase in the turnover likelihood. Hence, despite a potentially
higher turnover rate, CEO positions in unstable industries should remain attractive.
36See Daines, Nair, and Kornhauser (2005) for some descriptive statistics, however. Also, there is some evidence
that CEO pay is lower in regulated industries which–one could argue–are relatively more stable (see Murphy
(1999) for an overview of the literature). Similarly, Crawford, Ezzell, and Miles (1995) and Hubbard and Palia
(1995) both find that deregulation seems to have contributed to the rise of CEO pay in the banking industry.
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compensation is unequivocally desirable. For instance, if the CEO’s on-the-job compensation
is too large relative to his severance pay, any unduly increase in his on-the-job compensation
only aggravates his entrenchment problem. Our model does, however, suggest that imposing
an artificial cap on the CEO’s compensation may easily backfire (see also Proposition 6). The
consequence may be more, not less CEO entrenchment, less flexibility, and lower shareholder
value.
5.2 CEO Pay and Firm Characteristics
CEO Pay and Firm Size
Our analysis makes a natural prediction concerning the relation between CEO pay and firm
size. Intuitively, at larger firms there is more at stake: for a given state of nature θ < θFB
it is more costly for largers firms if the CEO stays in power when he should be replaced. To
mitigate these higher costs, larger firms should therefore have a higher θ∗ and hence higher
CEO turnover. Moreover, from our previous analysis we know that implementing a higher θ∗ is
costly: it implies that larger firms must oﬀer their CEOs both higher severance pay and higher
on-the-job compensation. To explore the implications of firm size for CEO pay and turnover,
we have scaled up both V and s by a factor α > 0. We have the following result.
Proposition 9. CEOs of larger firms should receive both higher severance pay and higher
on-the-job compensation. At the same time, larger firms should have higher CEO turnover.
Proof. See Appendix.
While varying firm size, we have not adjusted the CEO’s private benefits B of shirking. This
is because it seems not obvious to us if CEOs of larger firms need to work more or less hard.
Finally, it goes without saying that there may be alternative reasons for why CEOs of larger
firms are paid more, e.g., larger firms may need more talented and hence more expensive CEOs.
It is not clear, though, why this argument should necessarily also imply that larger firms have
higher CEO turnover.37
37Conyon (1997) and Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) both find that CEO compensation increases with firm size.
For evidence that larger firms have higher executive turnover, see Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988) and Murphy
(1999). Again, we do not mean to argue that there exists no plausible alternative explanation for this fact. For
instance, in smaller firms the CEO may often be the firm’s founder, who naturally remains longer in his position.
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CEO Pay and Firm Governance
There are two “drivers” in our model that aﬀect the size of the CEO’s compensation. First,
the CEO must be compensated for forgoing his private benefits B. Second, he must be com-
pensated for not becoming entrenched, which secures him an additional rent of W on top of
being compensated for his private benefits. In the following, we examine how these two factors
interact.
Suppose B increases. The direct eﬀect of this increase is that the CEO’s on-the-job compen-
sation must increase correspondingly to ensure that he does not shirk. But this only strenghtens
the CEO’s incentives to remain in power after observing a low state of nature, i.e., the CEO’s
privately optimal cutoﬀ θ∗ goes down. To counteract this drop in θ∗, the board must raise
the CEO’s severance pay, which–as we have shown previously–must be accompanied by an
(additional) increase in his on-the-job compensation. As Proposition 10 below shows, however,
it is not optimal to push θ∗ all the way up back to its original level. In consequence, an increase
in B results in a lower cutoﬀ θ∗ and hence in a higher level of CEO entrenchment.
The extent to which the CEO can consume private benefits may depend on his particular
job. Some CEO jobs may arguably allow for more perk consumption than others. But it will
realistically also depend on the firm’s corporate governance, which imposes a natural limit on
how much perks the CEO can consume. In this regard, B will be inversely related to the quality
of the firm’s corporate governance, if we define the latter with respect to the ease with which
CEOs can appropriate private benefits.38 We then have the following result.
Proposition 10. In firms with weak corporate governance it is more costly to reduce CEO
entrenchment in the sense that CEOs must be granted higher severance pay–and hence more
rents–as well as a higher on-the-job compensation. Moreover, firms with weak corporate gover-
nance will have more entrenched CEOs.
Proof. See Appendix.
Broadly speaking, Proposition 10 appears to be consistent with the empirical evidence, al-
though one must be cautious when equating explanatory variables used in empirical studies with
38This is arguably a narrow definition of corporate governance. Note that there is no contradiction in assuming
that the board can limit the CEO’s consumption of private benefits and assuming that the CEO has better
information about his match-specific quality or the likely success of the firm’s current strategy.
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“corporate governance quality”, which is a broad and relatively vague term. Generally, however,
it seems that CEO turnover is higher in firms with stronger corporate governance, and weak
corporate governance seems to be conducive to higher CEO pay.39
6 Conclusion
An important question in the debate about corporate governance is how the eﬀectiveness of
boards can be improved. Most eﬀorts along these lines have focused on changing the board
itself–i.e., its size and structure and the incentives given to individual board members. But
there is no reason why such eﬀorts should be limited to the board in a narrow sense. In the
end, any instrument or institution that can help mitigate the information disparity between the
CEO and the board will also make the board a better monitor. In this paper, we focus on
an instrument that, like the board of directors, has received much attention lately: executive
compensation. Specifically, assuming that the board cannot fully overcome the information
asymmetry vis-à-vis the CEO, we ask if there is a role for executive compensation in mitigating
the remaining ineﬃciency.
Our focus is on the board’s decision to replace the CEO. Given the CEO’s control over the
board’s information, he can easily entrench himself by simply hiding negative information that
would otherwise lead to his replacement. In the face of this problem, we find that it is optimal to
give the CEO a high-powered, non-linear compensation scheme that shifts as much as possible
of his compensation into states where the firm’s value is highest. Prominent examples are bonus
schemes and stock options. Intuitively, under a high-powered bonus scheme or option grant the
CEO’s incentives to entrench himself are minimized if he expects that the firm’s future value
under his continuing leadership is low. In consequence, less severance pay will be needed to
induce the CEO not to entrench himself in these situations. In our model, severance pay is
a measure of the CEO’s informational rents. Hence, we find that a high-powered, non-linear
compensation scheme minimizes the CEO’s informational rents while allowing a given level of
CEO entrenchment. Or, equivalently, it minimizes the CEO’s entrenchment while leaving him
a given amount of rents.
While our model suggests that generous CEO compensation packages may be warranted
39For empirical evidence see, e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), Cyert, Kang, and Kumar (2002), and
the literature surveyed in Hermalin and Weisbach (2003).
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under certain circumstances, it does not give a carte blanche to high CEO compensation as
such. A generous compensation package is only eﬀective if the board can strike the right balance
between the CEO’s on-the-job compensation and his severance pay. If the CEO’s on-the-job
compensation is too large, he will never be willing to give up his power. Conversely, if the CEO’s
severance package is too large, he will shirk and ineﬃciently focus on his exit options. Finally,
given that the CEO must be granted a potentially generous compensation package, it is not
optimal to fully eliminate CEO entrenchment, but only to mitigate it.
On a broader scale, our results suggest that formal or informal restrictions on either the level
or composition of CEO pay may stifle economic change. Promoting flexibility and voluntary
exit may require granting CEOs substantial rents in the form of seemingly generous severance
packages. In turn, high-powered compensation packages are necessary to economize on severance
pay and thus ultimately on the rents that CEOs can appropriate. Countries in which formal or
informal restrictions on CEO pay practices exist may therefore experience more, not less, CEO
entrenchment and may undergo less industrial change.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. The fact that W > 0 follows from the argument in the main text.
It remains to prove that it is uniquely optimal to give the CEO an on-the-job compensation
scheme of the form w(s) = 0 if s < sˆ and w(s) = s if s ≥ sˆ for some sˆ ∈ (s, s).
We argue to a contradiction. Suppose thus that the board wants to implement some θ∗ with
a diﬀerent on-the-job pay scheme ew(s). We denote the corresponding severance pay by fW . We
show that there exists some w(s) such that (i) the constraint (4) remains binding and that (ii)
θ∗ is still implemented–though now with a lower severance pay W . That is, with a slight abuse
of notation the new compensation scheme satisfies θ∗(w,W ) = θ∗( ew,fW ) = θ∗ and W < fW,
which by inspection of (2) would contradict optimality of the original contract ew(s).
We proceed in two steps. We first choose W = fW and w(s) with w(s) = 0 for s < bs0 and
w(s) = s for s ≥ bs0 such that θ∗(w,W ) = θ∗. That is, with d(s) := ew(s)−w(s) we have thatZ
S
d(s)gθ∗(s)ds = 0. (8)
Given the construction of w(s), which pays nothing for low and all for high s, there must be a
value es ∈ (s, s) such that d(s) ≥ 0 for all s < es and d(s) ≤ 0 for all s > es, where both inequalities
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are strict over sets of positive measure. Take now any bθ > θ∗. By MLRP of Gθ(s) and (8), it
then holds thatZ
S
d(s)gbθ(s)ds =
Z es
s
d(s)gθ∗(s)
gbθ(s)
gθ∗(s)
ds+
Z s
es d(s)gθ∗(s)
gbθ(s)
gθ∗(s)
ds (9)
<
gbθ(es)
gθ∗(es)
Z
S
d(s)gθ∗(s)ds = 0,
which implies that the constraint (4) is slack if we choose w(x) and W .
In a second step, we can now construct the asserted compensation scheme with w(s) = 0
for s < bs and w(s) = s for s ≥ bs and with W < W = fW . For this we continuously increase
the threshold bs0 in w(s) and decrease W , while still satisfying θ∗(w,W ) = θ∗, until (4) becomes
again binding. That this is possible follows from continuity of payoﬀs in bs0, while (4) surely
does not hold as we approach the upper limit with bs0 → s (and thus from θ∗(w,W ) = θ∗ also
W → 0). This completes the proof of Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. By the argument in the main text the possibility of manipulation
adds one additional constraint to the firm’s program: that the slope of w(s) must not exceed γ.
(Note that w(s) is then necessarily continuous such that by monotonicity it is almost everywhere
diﬀerentiable.) Following the argument in footnote 25, we restrict consideration to γ ≤ 1. We
argue again to a contradiction and suppose that the firm wants to implement a given θ∗ with
another contract ew(s). As in the proof of Proposition 2, we can then again construct a contract
w(s) with w(s) = 0 for s < bs0 and w(s) = γ(s− s) for s ≥ bs0 such that (8) is satisfied. As also
the slope of ew(s) must not exceed γ, there exists again a value es ∈ (s, s) such that d(s) ≥ 0
for all s < es and d(s) ≤ 0 for all s > es, where both inequalities are strict over sets of positive
measure. The rest of the argument is now identical to that in Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. By Proposition 3 an increase in γ allows to make the CEO’s com-
pensation strictly steeper to the right of the threshold bs, which is also strictly optimal.40 It
remains to prove that implementing a given θ∗ requires a lower severance pay as γ increases.
For this we totally diﬀerentiate (1), which determines θ∗, and also the constraint (6) to
obtain (holding θ∗ fixed) the derivative
dW
dγ
=
R θ
θ∗
hR sbs [[1−Gθ(bs)] [1−Gθ∗(s)]− [1−Gθ∗(bs)] [1−Gθ(s)]] dsi f(θ)dθR θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(bs)−Gθ(bs)] f(θ)dθ . (10)
40Holding either θ∗ or W fixed, to keep (4) binding the threshold bs will shift to the right as γ increases.
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The denominator of (10) is positive asGθ(s) satisfies First-Order Stochastic Dominance, which is
implied by MLRP. Next, to see that the numerator is negative note that [1−Gθ(s)] / [1−Gθ∗(s)]
is strictly increasing in s for all θ > θ∗, which is again implied by MLRP.41 Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. Totally diﬀerentiating the condition (1), which pins down θ∗, and
the constraint (6) while substituting the optimal on-the-job compensation from Proposition 3
yields
dθ∗
dW
= −1
γ
R θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(bs)−Gθ(bs)] f(θ)dθhR sbs dGθ∗ (bs)dθ∗ dsi hR θθ∗ [1−Gθ(bs)] f(θ)dθi . (11)
To determine the sign of (11), note that MLRP implies First-Order Stochastic Dominance
such that Gθ(s) is decreasing in θ for all s ∈ (s, s). This yields that dθ∗/dW > 0.
Consider next the claim that θ∗ < θFB.Totally diﬀerentiating (1) and (6) while substituting
the optimal on-the-job compensation from Proposition 3 yields
dbs
dW
= −1
γ
1− F (θ∗)R θ
θ∗ [1−Gθ(bs)] f(θ)dθ , (12)
We next diﬀerentiate (2) with respect toW and substitute for dbs/dW from (12). This yields
the derivative
− dθ
∗
dW
f(θ∗) [E[s | θ∗]− V ]− 1, (13)
which yields the first-order condition
E[s | θ∗]− V = −F (θ
∗)
f(θ∗)(dθ∗/dW )
. (14)
Using that dθ∗/dW > 0 from (11), we have at an interior solution that E[s | θ∗] − V < 0 and
thus that θ∗ < θFB. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7. We can again restrict consideration to on-the-job pay schemes
w(s, θ) that are strictly increasing at some s. Given that all w(s, θ) are thus strictly increasing
somewhere and that Gθ(s) satisfies MLRP, the truthtelling constraint implies again that Θ− =
41As Gθ(s) is diﬀerentiable, this is equivalent to requiring that gθ(s)/[1−Gθ(s)] is strictly decreasing in θ for
any given s ∈ (s, s). This is commonly referred to as the Monotone Hazard Rate Property, which is implied by
MLRP. Further, to obtain this expression we used that by partial integration E[w(s) | θ] = γ R sbs [1−Gθ(s)]ds.
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[θ, θ∗) and Θ+ = [θ∗, θ] with E[w(s, θ∗) | θ∗] = W. The following auxiliary result follows now
immediately from the proof of Proposition 2.
Claim 1. Take two diﬀerent feasible pay schemes ew(s) and bw(s) such that bw(s) = 0 for s < bs
and bw(s) = s for s ≥ bs. Then if E[ bw(s) | θ0] ≥ E[ ew(s) | θ0] holds for some θ0 < θ, it holds
strictly for all θ > θ0.
To complete the proof, we distinguish between two cases. If w(s, θ∗) satisfies w(s, θ∗) = 0
for s < bs and w(s, θ∗) = s for s ≥ bs, Claim 1 and truthtelling imply that the same contract is
chosen for all θ ≥ θ∗. That is, the menu is then degenerate with w(s, θ) = w(s, θ∗). Suppose
next that w(s, θ∗) has a diﬀerent form. As in the proof of Proposition 2, we can then construct
a single oﬀer bw(s) satisfying bw(s) = 0 for s < bs and bw(s) = s for s ≥ bs such that the same
cutoﬀ θ∗ is implemented while the constraint (4) is relaxed. This follows as for all θ > θ∗ we
have that E[ bw(s) | θ] > E[w(s, θ) | θ], which in turn follows immediately from Claim 1 and the
truthtelling requirement for the original menu. As in Proposition 2, we can then adjust the new
(single) on-the-job pay scheme bw(s) so as to implement θ∗ with a lower severance pay. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8. We show that the optimal choice of W is strictly increasing in V ,
which by (11) implies that the corresponding optimal choice of θ∗ is also strictly increasing.
Implicit diﬀerentiation of the first-order condition for W in (14) gives
dW
dV
= −f(θ
∗)(dθ∗/dW )
SOC
> 0,
where SOC < 0 represents the second-order condition, which must be satisfied at an interior
optimum. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 9. We show that the optimal choice of W is strictly increasing in α,
which by (11) implies that the corresponding optimal choice of θ∗ is also strictly increasing.
Note first that the first-order condition (14) now transforms to
α [E[s | θ∗]− V ] = −F (θ
∗)
f(θ∗)(dθ∗/dW )
, (15)
where we can again substitute dθ∗/dW from (11). Implicit diﬀerentiation of (15) gives
dW
dα
=
E[s | θ∗]− V
SOC
> 0,
34
where we used from Proposition 5 that θ∗ < θFB at the optimum and that the second-order
condition at the optimum requires that SOC < 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10. We show first that to implement a given cutoﬀ θ∗, the higher
B the higher must be the respective severance pay W . We totally diﬀerentiate (1), which
determines θ∗, and the constraint (6) to obtain
dW
dB
=
1−Gθ∗(bs)R θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(bs)−Gθ(bs)] f(θ)dθ > 0, (16)
where the sign follows again from MLRP of Gθ(s), which implies First-Order Stochastic Domi-
nance.
Take now some value B = bB . The optimal contract specifies a severance pay W = cW and
an on-the-job pay w(s) = bw(s), which is in turn characterized by some cutoﬀ (or “strike price”)bs = bs0. Denote also the resulting cutoﬀ by θ∗ = bθ∗. If private benefits are higher and equal to
B = eB > bB, we know from (16) that in order to obtain the same cutoﬀ θ∗ = bθ∗ the severance
pay must be strictly higher: W = fW > cW . To still satisfy the incentive constraint (6), this
requires that also the on-the-job pay ew(s) must become more attractive to the CEO, i.e., the
respective cutoﬀ bs = bs00 must satisfy bs00 < bs0.
Consider next the derivative (13) of the objective function. By construction, we have for
B = bB, bs = bs0, W = cW , and θ∗ = bθ∗ that the derivative is just zero. (This is just the first-
order condition.) We now want to sign the derivative if we substitute, instead, B = eB, bs = bs00,
W = fW , and θ∗ = bθ∗, i.e., at the point where with higher benefits the same cutoﬀ is achieved,
albeit with a higher severance pay and a higher on-the-job pay. More precisely, we want to
show that the derivative (13) is then negative. From inspection of (13) this is the case if at the
cutoﬀ θ∗ = bθ∗ the derivative dθ∗/dW is strictly lower for the case where we have B = eB and
thus W = fW and bs = bs00. Given that bs00 < bs0 this in turn holds if the derivative (11) is strictly
increasing in bs. To show that this is the case, we rearrange (11) to obtain
dθ∗
dW
=
1
γ
Ã
−1R sbs dGθ∗(s)dθ∗ ds
!⎛
⎝
R θ
θ∗ [Gθ∗(bs)−Gθ(bs)] f(θ)dθhR θ
θ∗ [1−Gθ(bs)] f(θ)dθi
⎞
⎠ . (17)
The first term of (17) in round brackets is positive and by dGθ∗(bs)/dθ∗ < 0, which is implied
by First-Order Stochastic Dominance and thus by MLRP, strictly increasing in bs. Next, after
some transformations we have that the sign of the derivative of the last term in (17) w.r.t. bs is
determined by the expression
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Z θ
θ∗
[gθ∗(bs) [1−Gθ(bs)]− gθ(bs) [1−Gθ∗(bs)]] f(θ)dθ. (18)
That (18) is also strictly positive follows again from MLRP, by which gθ(s)/[1 − Gθ(s)] must
be strictly decreasing in θ for all s ∈ (s, s).42 Hence, we have shown that given B = eB, if we
evaluate (13) at the valueW = fW where we have θ∗ = bθ∗, then the derivative is strictly negative.
Given strict quasiconcavity of the objective function and the assumption that the optimal θ∗
(and thus, in particular, bθ∗) is interior, we thus have that for B = eB the optimal level of the
severance pay is strictly lower than W = fW . But this finally implies that under the optimal
contract there is more entrenchment if B = eB than if B = bB < eB. Q.E.D.
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